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Austerity measures in response to Eurozone crisis have tended to be conceived, 
debated, and implemented as if only the technical parameters of budget 
management mattered. But policies that impose budgetary hardships on citizens, 
whether in the form of increased taxes or cuts to public spending go right to the 
heart of voter expectations about what it is both appropriate and acceptable for 
governments to do. Pro-cyclical measures that worsen an already difficult 
situation in a recession run counter to deep-seated norms and expectations in 
European countries, built up over decades of democratic governance, whereby 
governments are expected to provide offsetting protection for their citizens 
against the vicissitudes of the market. If austerity measures are held to be 
unavoidable in response to market turbulence, and especially if this view is 
underwritten by international authorities, new challenges of political 
legitimation are likely to arise. These issues are explored through the 
experiences of Spain and Ireland. 
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Variations in extreme austerity 
The crisis that engulfed the Eurozone from 2008 onward may be classed as 
extreme by any standards, in duration and severity. The interactions between 
financial and fiscal politics at national level proved difficult to manage effectively 
at national level, yet the mechanisms for policy coordination at European level 
were few and strengthening them proved to be fraught with political obstacles. 
The approach taken to crisis resolution, whereby each country’s problems were 
to be addressed one at a time, proved particularly burdensome for the worst-
affected countries of the periphery, in the absence of any early prospect of debt 
mutualization, bank resolution mechanisms, or sizeable fiscal transfers.   
The Greek experience has undoubtedly been more severe than that of the other 
periphery countries experiencing crisis, that is, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. This 
paper focuses on the tension that national governments within the Eurozone 
face in making tough choices in hard times, between the need to devise policy 
responses that will stabilize market expectations about economic performance 
on the one hand, and the pressures to maintain responsiveness and 
accountability to their own voters. The dynamics of political competition 
between the main political parties are central to accounting for what 
governments choose to do. We wish to show that crisis conditions heighten the 
difficulties governments experience in bridging the twin demands of economic 
stabilization and political legitimacy, and that this plays out rather differently 
depending on the nature of the political cleavages and the degree of policy 
convergence across the main political parties.  
We explore these issues through the divergent experiences of Spain and Ireland. 
Countries’ responses to crisis between 2008 and 2010 initially displayed a range 
of variation. In response to a G8 initiative, many countries put stimulus measures 
in place to counteract the severe contraction in the wake of the financial crisis. 
These involved different combinations of tax cuts and spending programmes, 
and have been credited with preventing the headlong tumble of the developed 
economies into 1930s-style depression (Eichengreen & O'Rourke, 2010). But 
Ireland and Spain responded very differently (Armingeon, 2012; Dellepiane & 
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Hardiman, 2012b). Both countries had comparably low levels of aggregate debt 
and no fiscal deficit, so on the face of it, they had comparable levels of fiscal 
‘headroom’ to engage in stimulus measures. But while Spain was among the most 
fiscally active in supporting economic performance through fiscal intervention, 
any small stimulus at work in Ireland was an overspill from the pro-cyclical 
measures the government had been running in the years before the crisis hit. 
Between 2008 and 2010, Ireland undertook a fiscal contraction that was larger 
in scale even than Iceland’s (OECD, 2010, p.290). 
During this time, however, the growing severity of the crisis in Greece had made 
European policy leaders ever more anxious about the fiscal balances across the 
Eurozone – a key policy indicator of Eurozone stability, in accordance with the 
terms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Greece’s slide into an emergency 
loan agreement in May 2010 was a moment of acute nervousness among market 
actors, when fear of a contagion effect reached a new peak. At this moment, we 
find the Spanish government under extreme pressure to do something to provide 
reassurance to the highly volatile international markets – and experiencing 
pressure from European and other international policy makers too. The only 
apparent resources with which to regain market confidence were those of fiscal 
austerity. From May 2010 therefore, we see a sea-change in official policy in 
Spain with a sharp turn toward austerity measures.  
From this point, Ireland and Spain were on convergent policy paths, locked into 
the politics of austerity in order to regain market credibility. In Ireland, orthodox 
measures were already in place, but the intense economic pressure to bring 
down the deficit and control the debt, in the face of escalating interest rates, 
forced the government into entering an EC-ECB-IMF loan programme in 
November 2010.  In the process, where Irish taxpayers were required to take on 
the total losses of the banking sector while private bondholders were fully 
reimbursed, which raised the total volume of debt by about one-third by 2013, 
and the total cost of which is estimated ultimately to reach some 40% of GDP.  
The scale of fiscal effort in the Eurozone periphery has been considerable. Figure 
1 shows that Greece made the most dramatic improvements among OECD 
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countries in its primary fiscal balance between 2009 and 2012, and after Iceland, 
Ireland and Spain were the next most successful in these terms. 
Figure 1. The scale of fiscal effort, 2009-2012 
However, the political capital expended on making these considerable efforts has 
not necessarily paid of in terms of improving the recorded fiscal deficit. For the 
deficit is a function not only of governments’ efforts to cut spending and raise 
taxes, but also of the performance of the economy itself, since recessionary 
conditions dampen the revenue base while pushing up claims on automatic 
entitlements. Table 1 shows that governments have experienced different levels 
of success in meeting their mandated targets. Greece, mired in the deepest levels 
of recession, has found it most difficult to reach the required goals; Spain has 
suffered repeated slippage; Ireland has mostly managed to perform to target, but 
even at that, there was often slippage on particular items such as healthcare 
spending, and the postponement of targets between reporting periods, which 
darken the story somewhat (European Commission, 2013a, p.214). 
Table 1. Expected and actual deficit out-turns in Greece, Spain, and Ireland 
The competing imperatives of market credibility and political legitimacy 
The global economic crisis exposed sharply divergent views about the political 
economy of democratic societies, and these had far-reaching implications for 
managing conflicts between committing to economic stabilization measures and 
ensuring the democratic sustainability of these measures. One the one hand were 
the voices of those adopting a Keynesian perspective on macroeconomic 
performance, who argued that no fiscal corrections should be undertaken in the 
depths of recession, when output was falling and unemployment rising. Stimulus 
measures, in this view, should be sustained until growth was re-established, and 
only then should excessive deficits and cumulative debts be addressed. On the 
other hand, the orthodox economic perspective that had taken hold since the 
1980s, round which neo-classical and New Keynesian views converged, was 
strongly averse to the emergence of large deficits and rising debts.  
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The Eurozone had no institutional capacity to treat the members of European 
Monetary Union as a macroeconomic entity within which stimulus now could be 
balanced against fiscal stabilization during a subsequent recovery (Dellepiane & 
Hardiman, 2010). Official policy insisted that fiscal contraction must be 
undertaken to conform to the deficit rules of the SGP. From 2009, therefore, we 
may discern a growing official preoccupation with securing market credibility as 
a measure of the success of a government’s policy stance.  
The orthodox perspective, committed to the view that reducing deficits was a 
precondition for the resumption of growth, drew upon an older and contested 
literature on fiscal consolidations of the 1990s which held that fiscal 
contractions could be expansionary, and that spending cuts were a more reliable 
route to sustained budget stabilization than tax increases. The logic was that by 
displaying a commitment to tackle budget deficits by reducing demands on the 
public purse, governments would gain credibility among investors as the 
guarantors of a business-friendly environment, and that new investment would 
follow that would generate a new phase of sustained growth. Thus building the 
confidence of the markets became the keystone of European responses to crisis. 
At this time though, market confidence in the capacity of sovereign governments 
to manage the crisis was very volatile. Between 2002 and 2008, interest rates 
across the Eurozone had converged upon German rates. But from 2008, when 
investors realized that there was in fact no prospect of debt mutualization, no 
burden-sharing of the cost of rescuing failed banks, and no fiscal transfers to 
alleviated the costs of adjustment, what had been a financial and a fiscal crisis 
suddenly became a sovereign debt crisis as well, as the peripheral governments 
encountered sharply rising costs of rolling over their own debts. As De Grauwe 
and Yi have argued, market panic in the face of European policy disarray caused 
interest rates to diverge dramatically. The orthodox response to this from the 
European policy-makers, was to require countries to address this within their 
own national policy resources. Regaining market confidence was interpreted in 
the orthodox view as a matter of displaying commitment to closing budget 
deficits and bringing down debt. The official response to market panic was a 
panicked imposition of austerity (De Grauwe & Ji, 2013).  
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The economic feasibility of doing this in the depths of recessionary conditions 
was challenged from the outset. But the political sustainability of such a strategy 
had been accorded very little if any weight by its framers (Blyth, 2013; 
Dellepiane, 2012). Adjusting to market requirements was treated primarily as a 
technical matter. When this proved deeply politically unpopular, the European 
policy makers were at a loss. In the countries that proved least politically capable 
of driving these measures through in Greece and in Italy, temporary technocratic 
governments were appointed. European leaders proved willing to dispense with 
democratic processes altogether to ensure that orthodox policies were 
sustained. 
Under standard assumptions about democratic governance, governments must 
consider whether or not they can win enough popular support to implement 
policy. Opposition can come about immediately through popular protest, or at 
election time, when the incumbent government may risk losing power. We know 
relatively little about the conditions under which governments can undertake 
austerity measures on a sustained basis. Earlier phases of fiscal retrenchment 
seemed to suggest that it might be possible if the government could persuade 
enough of the electorate that the measures were unavoidable; if there is cross-
party agreement on the objectives such that they cannot be derailed through 
adversarial party competition; and – crucially – that the austerity measures 
would be no more than a temporary correction (Mauro, 2011). But in a 
democracy, there are likely to be limits to how long voters will endure ongoing 
hardships without looking for protection from their consequences, and 
ultimately for an end to these policies (Polanyi, 1944/2002).  
Efforts to secure political legitimation for the new politics of austerity became 
increasingly problematic. Democratic politics implies that government will act in 
the interests of its national constituency. Political contestation may divide 
opinion, often sharply, but the institutional framework requires that those who 
exercise power both represent and are accountable to those who vote for them. 
But increasingly, the key decisions affecting the citizens of a state are made at a 
level beyond that of national political debate. National politicians find that they 
are required to be ‘responsive’ to their own voters; but the matters on which 
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they have to make decisions are not within the control of national politics, and 
they are required to be ‘responsible’ to stakeholders beyond the state’s borders 
(Mair, 2009, 2011). Indeed, the transnational mobility of capital, and the 
globalization of economic activity more generally, means that many aspects of 
international market activity are not accountable to any democratic forum. 
International coordination on matters such as the codification and enforcement 
of regulatory standards are a limited substitute for the equivalent of national 
democratic governance systems at a transnational level (Crouch, 2011; Koppell, 
2010; Rodrik, 2011).  
The link between voters and their representatives is further attenuated by other 
developments in party political organization: the mass parties of old, which were 
deeply rooted in their membership and closely tied to the advancement of 
common concerns and issues of collective interest, have given way to a 
professionalized cadre of professional politicians. Public opinion has become 
more fragmented, and more likely to be expressed through other kinds of civil 
society organizations including single-issue pressure groups and loosely 
structured new social movements (Crouch, 2004). The implication of this is that 
political parties are not well positioned to take up and advance the grievances of 
their own voters. Yet they are required to be ever more attentive not only to the 
policy-makers at the level of trans-national governance, such as the European 
Commission, the European Council, and the European Central Bank, but also to 
the preferences of transnational economic actors such as international lenders, 
corporate investors, and big businesses.  
In the Eurozone, when ‘fiscal effort’ did not translate into sustained 
improvements in fiscal deficit outcomes, countries found that the political 
credibility they had expended on making the fiscal adjustments did not 
necessarily translate into gains in market credibility. As Figure 2 shows, as late 
as autumn 2009, the Eurozone states were able to secure long-term loans on the 
bond markets at rates that were very similar to those of Germany. Over the 
following years, the dearth of credit caused an economic contraction that 
worsened fiscal balances, which in turn contributed to making fresh loans more 
difficult to secure. And yet interest rates appeared to vary not only in relation to 
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economic fundamentals and the realities of governments’ fiscal effort, but were 
also shaped by market expectations of European actions to alleviate issues of 
debt sustainability and financial sector recapitalization (De Grauwe, 2013).  
Figure 2. Ten-year interest rates on government bonds 
Long-term structural shifts in the reach of political power, combined with the 
problems of the governability of the Eurozone economy in the wake of crisis, 
raised two new questions about the interplay between economics and politics. 
Firstly, the politics of austerity, so far from creating the conditions for renewed 
growth, has pushed the countries of the Eurozone periphery into new self-
perpetuating cycles of low growth and high unemployment. Secondly, it became 
clearer that the sustained implementation of austerity exerted a high political 
cost on the legitimacy of the mainstream parties, with implications for 
democratic politics itself that are as yet unclear.  
And yet there are also important variations not only in the way governments 
have responded to crisis, but also in the extent to which they have managed to 
bridge the conflicting imperatives of gaining market credibility and sustaining 
political legitimacy. The contrasting dynamics of party politics in Spain and 
Ireland help us to understand these differences. 
Credibility and legitimacy issues in Spain 
The Spanish government’s first response to the emergence of international 
economic crisis was to claim that its relevance to Spain was minimal. The 
Socialist Party (PSOE) had been re-elected in March 2008 at a time when concern 
was already mounting, as in Ireland, over the sustainability of the housing boom 
that had gathered pace under the low interest rate regime of European Monetary 
Union. Prime Minister Zapatero initially preferred to characterize the situation 
as an economic slowdown, through which the hoped-for ‘soft landing’ would 
resolve the asset price bubble painlessly. Moreover, spending commitments in 
the run-up to the election (including an annual income tax rebate and a grant for 
new-born children), following on a series of expansionary budgets, were 
predicated on continued economic buoyancy. As in Ireland, fiscal populism based 
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on lower taxes and higher spending under conditions of growth had yielded 
electoral benefits, even though this weakened the bases of government’s fiscal 
capacity.  Nevertheless the PSOE government implemented an early fiscal 
stimulus, mostly in the form of tax cuts and extra welfare entitlements, as a 
counter-measure to what was depicted as a temporary weakening in domestic 
demand. This was viewed as entirely consistent with the European Economic 
Recovery Plan. Discretionary fiscal stimulus in Spain accounted for 2.4% of GDP 
in 2009, as opposed to only 0.3% in Ireland (European Commission, 2009, 2010). 
The budget for 2009 gave effect to a number of the spending commitments 
promised in the election campaign, based on projections of GDP growth of 1% 
and a deficit of 2%. These quickly proved to be unrealistic. It became clear that 
Spain had indeed entered a crisis when the actual outturn was a fall in GDP of 
3.7% and a fiscal deficit of 11.7%. 
Once the severity of the economic crisis became clear, Zapatero adopted what he 
termed a ‘Social Democratic approach to the crisis’. The budget for 2010 was 
intended to phase out the extraordinary stimulus that had been in effect during 
2009, not by cutting spending, but through a revenue-based consolidation 
strategy. The Budget for 2010 was primarily based on revenue-increasing 
measures such as withdrawing the earlier tax rebate and increasing VAT, which 
raised taxes by about 1.5% of GDP. The overt objective was to protect core social 
spending and to shield welfare beneficiaries from the effects of the downturn. 
For example, in one of his speeches Zapatero said ‘I am going to ask for a share of 
people’s income out of solidarity and to meet the demands of the most needy’. 
The conservative opposition Partido Popular (PP), in contrast, argued for 
spending cuts to be introduced. 
The pivotal moment in Spain’s fiscal response to crisis came in May 2010, and it 
was triggered by the crisis in Greece. Paradoxically, Spain’s fiscal fundamentals 
were not in bad shape at this time. Its projected debt for 2010 stood at some 
65% of GDP. It was a combination of market panic, and panicked international 
political response to the Greek crisis, that put enormous pressure on Zapatero to 
change political course. According to insiders, the pressure was simply 
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‘unbearable’.  Over the 8/9 May weekend, Merkel and Sarkozy “demanded” an 
immediate  €30bn cut in the Spanish budget (Merkel especially stressed that the 
sacrifice must engage pensions). International pressure also involved telephone 
calls by many leaders, including President Obama.  
Ironically, only weeks ago, Strauss-Kahn, the then IMF General Director had 
allegedly warned Zapatero about the sizeable risks associated with an early 
withdrawal of fiscal stimulus (taking into account Spain’s available fiscal space 
and notably high unemployment). This suggests that the big policy reversal of 
May 2010 might have been surrounded not only by high levels of uncertainty, 
but also by a good deal of improvisation. As Ortega and Pascual-Ramsay (2012) 
argue, the Spanish government was compelled to implement the adjustment 
quickly (in a matter of days!), without much reflection, and of course without 
enough time to deliberate and build consensus, let alone develop a convincing 
political narrative. In the event, the austerity package, widely constructed by the 
media as “the major social adjustment under democracy”, was approved in 
parliament by only one vote.     
In what was depicted as a ‘Copernican shift’ in the government’s stance, a new 
emergency budget intensified the pace and impact of the deficit reduction 
programme announced in the 2010 Budget, and switched from a revenue-based 
to a spending-based strategy. The dramatic shift in fiscal strategy aimed to 
secure €15bn in spending cuts for the second half of 2010 and into 2011, or 
1.5% GDP. The plan was to achieve a debt to GDP ratio of 60.1% for 2010, 
instead of the previously forecast 65.9% - relatively low debt levels by European 
standards. The measures included direct cuts to civil service salaries of an 
average of 5% in 2010 and an ongoing freeze in 2011, cuts of 15% to politicians’ 
pay, changes to pension entitlements, elimination of the headline-grabbing 
grants to infants, elimination of dependency benefits, and cuts to the public 
capital programme (Mulas-Granados, 2010).   
These measures represented a radical break from the government’s prior fiscal 
stance, and it was a very difficult moment for the ‘social Zapatero’ who had 
insisted upon the primacy of Social Democratic priorities over market pressures. 
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But market pressures were probably part of the story. It seems that Zapatero 
having notoriously failed to accept and confront the crisis on time, felt compelled 
to go overboard to restore its highly damaged reputation. Indeed, avoiding the 
national humiliation of an European bailout “at all costs” became his overarching 
mission (Sanchez-Cuenca 2012; Estefania 2013). The social approach to the 
crisis was practically abandoned in favour of an “epic” rhetoric based on the 
ideas of necessity, responsibility and collective effort (Ortega and Pascual-
Ramsay 2012). This over-commitment to the austerity cause, reflected in the 
reluctance to enforce compensatory measures, but also in PSOE’s counter-
intuitive parliamentary support to the constitutionalization of budget limits in 
August 2011, further alienated Zapatero’s constituents.    
In any case, it is far from clear that the change of fiscal direction and political 
strategy actually succeeded in securing market confidence. Successive moves to 
tighten fiscal policy were intended to signal to the markets that the government 
was serious about deficit reduction. But we can see from the ratings’ agencies 
assessments of Spain’s prospects, in Figure 3 below, that each moment of 
tightening was followed by a downgrading of its loan status – because of 
expectations that growth would be further dampened. 
Figure 3. Ratings agencies’ ratings for Spain 
The about-turn in fiscal strategy during 2010 was driven by the perceived need 
to restore market credibility. But from this moment, we can see that a 
considerable political cost was exerted on the Socialist government. From May 
2010 onward, Zapatero was obliged to prioritize market credibility over the 
party’s programmatic priorities, and this made it difficult to sustain the party’s 
core support in the teeth of painful fiscal retrenchment. The May 2010 
Emergency Plan was a turning point in the PSOE’s popularity, illustrating the 
difficulties in both accommodating market pressures and building democratic 
legitimacy. The minority PSOE government lost the strategic support of all the 
small left-leaning groups (including BNG, ERC and IU) on which it had relied to 
secure voting majorities in parliament. These were alienated not only by the shift 
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in focus toward spending cuts, but also by the lack of balancing measures such as 
the apparently favourable treatment of wealth and of high-income earners.  
 From May 2010, as Figure 4 shows, we can see a steep decline in confidence in 
the government. A socialist deputy said in May 2010 that ‘today we have lost the 
next general election’. Indeed, the first of what was to be a series of general 
strikes was held in September 2010. 
Figure 4. Opinion poll ratings of political parties in Spain 
Zapatero’s government continued to pursue measures oriented toward bringing 
down Spain’s fiscal deficit, in an orthodox contractionary manner. The Budget for 
2011, introduced at the end of 2010, came at a time of ongoing instability on the 
bond markets. Ireland entered an EU-IMF loan programme at this time, and 
speculation was running high as to whether Portugal or Spain would be next in 
line. The prospect of Spain needing a rescue programme was the great worry for 
European decision-makers: it was thought ‘too big to fail’, yet too big to rescue 
too (Jones, 2010).  
The objectives of this Budget were twofold. On the one hand, government stated 
its intention to embark on a steady path of fiscal consolidation; on the other, it 
stated its intention to undertake a programme of structural reforms aimed at 
ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability and accelerating ‘the change of the 
productive model’ (‘el cambio en el modelo productivo’). The key objective was 
to meet the deficit target of 6% of GDP. The deficit had been 11.1% in 2009 and 
9.3% in 2010. But in the context of a slow recovery, in which growth was 
expected to be 1.3%, this could prove challenging. Budget 2011 consolidated the 
emergency measures taken in May 2010 mostly through spending cuts. Non-
financial spending was set to decrease by 7.9%. Austerity measures also entailed 
a drastic cut in public investment in infrastructure, which was reduced by 30%, 
and a moderate reduction in personnel.  
And yet, throughout all these spending cuts, the PSOE government continued to 
protect the core components of the welfare state and social policy. According to 
the government, social cohesion was still a central objective, even in the context 
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of austerity. In the words of the Socialist Minister for Economy and Finance 
Elena Salgado, ‘Son unos Presupuestos austeros, que generan cohesión social e 
impulsan la actividad económica’ (‘This is an austere budget that generates 
social cohesion and fosters economic activity’). The government had some 
discretion over how to manage the deficit-reduction strategy whose targets it 
had accepted, under the aegis of the European Excessive Deficit Procedures.  
In the election of November 2011, PSOE suffered the expected electoral defeat. It 
was not a business-as-usual incumbent defeat; the socialists suffered the worst 
electoral defeat since 1977. A change of government did not mean a change in 
the policy objectives the government pursued, but it did mean a change in the 
priorities and methods adopted. The new PP government, headed by Mariano 
Rajoy, accepted the framework of deficit reduction. Cristobal Montoro, the 
Ministry for Finance, made clear the objectives of the incoming government:  
‘The first objective is the deficit; the second, the deficit; and the third, the deficit’ 
(El Pais, 4/4/12). If anything, the budgets for 2012 and 2013 deepened the 
commitment towards spending-based consolidation and structural reforms. In 
the interests of boosting business confidence, and consistent with the market-
liberalizing advice coming from the EU policy leaders, the emphasis shifted more 
decisively toward cutting expenditure rather than broadening the tax base and 
increasing revenues.  
The results were highly disappointing, though. The promised “expansionary 
fiscal contraction” never materialised. The economic slump continued and 
unemployment kept raising to historical thresholds. In the context of increasing 
uncertainty (lower credibility), the Spanish financial system was finally bailed 
out. In the legitimacy front, the conservatives struggled as much as the socialists, 
not least because they were forced to break, one by one, practically all their 
electoral pledges, on taxes, on pensions, on the bailout, on the bank rescue. In 
November 2011, PP had a voting intention of 44.6%; in May 2013, this figure was 
down to 22.5% (the ratings of the government and its key figures, including 
Rajoy, were at record-low levels). Strikingly, the opposition PSOE was 
performing even worse: the socialists had a voting intention of around 20%, 
some nine points below the already low levels of November 2011. Crisis 
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management has clearly compromised, and indeed heavily undermined, the 
political bases of the PP-PSOE duopoly.       
Credibility and legitimacy issues in Ireland 
In marked contrast with the Spanish experience, the Irish government composed 
of the centre-right Fianna Fáil party and the small Green Party, in power 
between 2007 and February 2011, took the view from mid-2008 that closing the 
deficit was an urgent priority. It also held the ‘orthodox’ position that an 
emphasis on spending cuts over tax increases was the most appropriate way of 
doing this, and this view was consistently maintained throughout the very tough 
times to follow. Furthermore, although the opposition parties that formed the 
subsequent coalition government, comprising the centre-right Fine Gael party 
and the Labour Party, differed on matters of emphasis, they accepted the 
constraints imposed by the loan agreement of November 2010. There was no 
fundamental disagreement over the policy objectives Ireland was required to 
adopt or over the means of achieving them.  
The consistency of approach after 2008 was frequently lauded by EU and IMF 
policy leaders: by 2012 and 2013, Ireland was widely seen as a so-called poster-
child for austerity, meeting its targets for deficit reduction, and giving rise to 
some signs that investor confidence was improving. The worst moment (as 
Figure 2 illustrates) was in mid-2011, when market confidence in Irish capacity 
to return to borrowing on the international markets was at its shakiest, as the 
scale of banking-related losses was subject to further upward estimation. 
Matters improved subsequently, such that Ireland was expected to be able to exit 
the loan programme on schedule at end-2013. 
However, mismanagement of the economy during the boom years, especially 
between 2000 and 2008, had contributed to making the crisis much more sever 
than it needed to be. A persistent bias toward pro-cyclical fiscal policy during the 
boom meant that public spending had increased rapidly year on year. 
Meanwhile, the income tax base had been narrowed through cuts in headline 
rates and exemptions for the lowest-paid, resulting in a situation where the 
average incidence of income tax and social insurance liabilities on most 
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households was among the lowest in the OECD, and about 40% of employees 
paid no income tax at all (Dellepiane & Hardiman, 2012a; OECD, 2009). Reckless 
bank lending, combined with inappropriate fiscal incentives, resulted in a 
housing boom on an even larger scale than that of Spain’s. Government had come 
to rely ever more heavily on buoyant revenues from construction-related 
activities, and the implosion of the building industry had a disproportionate 
impact on the public finances. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US brought underlying worries about the 
stability of the Irish economy to a head. In particular, the banks now revealed 
that, despite assurances under the ‘light-touch’ financial regulatory regime that 
all was well, they were in fact in deep trouble (Clarke & Hardiman, 2012). On the 
assumption that this was a liquidity and not an insolvency problem, Minister for 
Finance Brian Lenihan took the single most far-reaching decision in the Irish 
crisis on 30 September 2008, which was to guarantee not only all bank deposits, 
but the liabilities of most categories of bondholders. At the time, due to the 
wholly inadequate information available to government about the devastation 
the banks had brought upon themselves, Lenihan announced that the Irish bank 
bailout would be ‘the cheapest in the world’, compared with bank rescues in 
other countries, including the UK and the US, where ‘billions and billions of 
taxpayers' money are being poured into financial institutions’ (Carswell, 2008). 
When the scale of the implications became clearer, it would appear that the 
European Central Bank exerted pressure to insist that no measures should be 
introduced to require burden-sharing by the private sector (or at least not until 
the permanent European debt resolution facility came into effect, which was 
expected to happen in 2013). The consequence was that the total liabilities of the 
domestic banks were to be borne by the taxpayers (Donovan & Murphy, 2013; 
O'Brien, 2011).  
A series of deficit-tightening measures during 2008 and 2009 failed to improve 
Ireland’s market credibility, and they also stoked up some one-day episodes of 
strike action and street protest by public sector union employees (Dellepiane & 
Hardiman, 2012b). The sharpest budget cuts came in December 2009, and 
involving overall cuts to public sector salaries of between 7% and 15%, and cuts 
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to all categories of welfare recipients. The aim, as ever, was to put some distance 
between Ireland and Greece. This preemptive approach to fiscal consolidation 
was widely lauded as exemplary and a model to other countries under pressure:  
‘In a week when Greece and Spain both saw their credit ratings under attack, the 
budget at least gave the government an opportunity to reassure international 
investors that Ireland, unlike some other EU countries, is serious about 
controlling its budget deficit and public-debt burden’ (The Economist, 2009). 
Greece’s need to avail of a new EU loan facility in May 2010 was a key moment in 
Ireland as in Spain, but for different reasons. As the scale of losses in the Irish 
banks – particularly Anglo Irish Bank – became clearer, and as fear of the 
contagion effects of Greek vulnerability spread, Irish bond spreads reach a new 
high, and the rate continued to go up throughout May and June (Carswell, 
2011a). In the course of 2010, GDP fell more than anticipated, and the scale of 
the fiscal consolidation that would be required to meet the 2010 3% deficit 
target continued to escalate. The effort required to rescue the distressed banking 
sector also increased, and the new ‘worst case scenario’ estimate for bank 
bailout in the autumn of 2010 was €51bn (a figure that would go up again in 
spring 2011).  
In September 2010, the government projected that the fiscal consolidation 
required in 2011 would now be €3bn. The estimated total effort required 
between 2011 and 2014 had stood at €7.5bn. Now a revised estimate indicated 
that €15bn of fiscal consolidation would be needed to meet the Stability 
Programme deficit targets. 
At this time, government spending needs were fully funded into mid-2011 and 
there was no immediate need to return to the bond markets. There was no 
immediate prospect of any sovereign debt default. Right up to a very short time 
before the loan agreement actually happened, the government continued to deny 
publicly that it was in negotiations with the EU and the IMF.  
The Irish banks, along with the Irish government, were now locked out of 
international lending markets, and something needed to be done about their 
drastically impaired balance sheets. Ireland’s 2008 bank guarantee was due to 
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expire at this time. Investors were slowly haemorrhaging abroad. The banks 
were becoming ever more heavily reliant on short-term liquidity from the ECB. It 
would appear that extreme pressure came from the ECB to require the Irish 
government to seek a loan agreement until 2013 in November 2010 (Economist, 
2010). Not only this, but the government came under intense pressure to extend 
its earlier blanket guarantee to the banks. This meant that instead of imposing 
some of the burden of adjustment on private sector bondholders, and getting 
assistance for the public rescue of the banking system from the Eurozone at 
large, all the liabilities of the ruined banks now had to be met by Irish taxpayers.  
In a wide-ranging interview he gave in April 2011, after he had left office and 
shortly before he died, Brian Lenihan gave a wide-ranging interview about what 
had happened. He confirmed that the ECB had played a central role in insisting 
that the full cost of the ruined banks had to be borne by the Irish state. He 
recounts that neither the European Commission officials nor the IMF had been 
concerned about the Irish situation, and that it was the ECB that forced the issue. 
Their top echelon pressed their view ‘with great vigour’ that ‘putting the fiscal 
house in order’ more rapidly would resolve the banking problem, a view that 
Lenihan did not agree with. But the ECB insisted that ‘the future of the currency 
union was at stake’ (O'Brien, 2011).  
The terms of the €85bn EU-IMF loan package were controversial. They included 
an obligation to deploy the National Pension Reserve Fund in the front-line of 
bank recapitalization plans. The interest rate on the tranche of the loan extended 
by the ECB was subject to a higher interest rate than expected, also a subject of 
contention. By 2011, the Irish banks were being kept afloat on about €100bn in 
ECB loans at very low interest rates of 1%, plus a further €70bn in liquidity 
provided by the Irish central bank and ultimately underwritten by the ECB 
(Brown & Atkins, 2011; O'Brien, 2011). 
In November 2010, the Government announced in its National Recovery Plan 
2011-2014 that was in fact entirely consistent with the terms of the 
Memorandum of Understanding with the ECB and IMF announced at the same 
time. This was intended to front-load the fiscal adjustment process. On the 
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framing of the 2011 budget that implemented the Plan, Lenihan later said: ‘I was 
concerned that once we went beyond the figure of €4.5 billion adjustment, about 
the economic damage it would do to the country, and I was unhappy at having to 
put the figure much higher than that’ (O'Brien, 2011). In the event, a total of 
€6bn was to be taken out of the economy in 2011 (Department of Finance, 
2010).  
The National Recovery Plan projected adjustments of €15bn between 2011 and 
2014, €10bn in spending cuts and €5bn in taxation. It anticipated that the deficit 
would be reduced to 9.1% GDP in 2011, with steady reductions thereafter to 
below 3% by 2014. The debt to GDP ratio was expected to peak at 102% GDP in 
2013, and to fall to 100% by 2014.These projections set the framework for the 
specific measures set out in Budget 2011 in December 2010. At this point, 
national per capita income was already 20% lower in 2010 than it was in 2007. 
But as Table 1 shows, these estimates had to be revised over time, because fiscal 
contraction in a stagnant economy caused further worsening of the outcomes, 
meaning that government was chasing a moving target. 
In addition to large spending cuts, there were big increases in most forms of 
taxation in the December 2010 Budget. Rates of income tax remained constant, 
but the tax net widened to cover an extra 300,000 people, broadening the tax 
base from 45% to 60% of the workforce. The other key measure was the 
introduction of a Universal Social Charge, which replaced both the existing 
income levy and the health levy (also known as the health contribution) on 1 
January 2011. The national hourly minimum wage was cut by €1 to €7.65, with a 
view to increasing low-end labour market flexibility. 
However, already in December, the underlying budget deficit was estimated at 
11.6% GDP, and the Budget statement claimed that the measures adopted would 
stabilize it at that level. The Budget also stated that GDP was expected to grow at 
an annual rate of 2.7% until 2014. Commentators considered these 
commitments to be optimistic, and indeed ECOFIN extended Ireland’s excessive 
deficit target deadline from 2014 to 2015 at this point. Meanwhile, government 
was also committed to undertaking a range of structural reforms including 
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stronger fiscal oversight arrangements, review of labour market flexibility, and 
rigidities in some of the professions. 
As in the Spanish case, Ireland’s long-drawn-out efforts to improve its market 
credibility proved self-defeating. As Figure 5 shows, the ratings agencies slashed 
their ratings at this time, and they continued to fall as Irish governments made 
ongoing efforts to deal with the very large deficit it had incurred. The Irish 
government made massive fiscal efforts that resulted in relatively little visible 
fiscal retrenchment. By end-2010, the size of the public deficit had risen to 12% 
or about €18bn (with a GDP of €153.9bn), the debt-to-GDP ratio was about 
100%, and the IMF projected that it would peak at 120% in 2013 before 
stabilizing (IMF, 2011). Eurostat reports Ireland’s deficit at -32% GDP for 2010, 
since the bank rescue costs are all charged against that year; thereafter they 
accrue to the total public debt. Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan noted in 
Budget 2011 that Ireland had undertaken an implicit consolidation effort of 
about 10% of GDP in two years. The total fiscal adjustment between 2008 and 
2014 (according to the National Recovery Plan 2011-2014) amounts to €30bn, 
equivalent to about 20% of 2010-level GDP.  
Figure 5. Ratings agencies’ ratings for Ireland 
By the time of the loan programme in November 2010, the incumbent 
government was extremely unpopular. The fact that Irish taxpayers had been 
required to renew the bank guarantee and to assume total liability for their 
private-sector debts was the focus of intense anger and frustration in the run-up 
to the election of February 2011.  
The fiscal burden of rescuing the banks proved to be extremely onerous. There 
were three moments of attempted final bail-out of the banks, following stress 
tests in March 2010, September 2010, and then again in March 2011. The 
running cost of rescuing the banks rose from an estimate of €5.5 billion in late 
2008, to €11 billion in the first half of 2009, to €35 billion in March 2010, to €46 
billion in September 2010, by which time the total bank recapitalization 
requirements totalled about €70bn, in what was announced as the last and final 
upward revision of the cost of bailing out the Irish banks (Irish Times, 31 March 
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2011). Fine Gael Finance Minister noted that ‘The state will be committing 
approximately 45 per cent of gross domestic product in the banks in a two-year 
period' (Noonan, 2011). Losses at the Irish banks and the foreign lenders in 
Ireland topped €100 billion. In an ironic though unintended reversal of 
Lenihan’s early claim about how lightly Ireland would get out of its bank bailout, 
the Governor of the Central Bank Professor Patrick Honohan called this ‘one of 
the costliest banking crises in history’ (Carswell, 2011b).  
The Fianna Fáil-Green coalition’s support in the polls had been sliding steadily 
over time. Fianna Fáil was historically the dominant party in the Irish party 
system, and typically secured up to 40% of the total vote, drawn from across all 
social classes. Figure 6 shows that the first marked drop in support for the 
governing parties came after the bank guarantee in September 2008, and that it 
plummeted after the EC-ECB-IMF loan programme in November 2010.  
Figure 6. Opinion poll ratings of political parties in Ireland 
The general election of February 2011 brought the expected change of 
government – a coalition of Fine Gael and Labour – but the scale of the losses 
suffered by Fianna Fáil was very striking (Gallagher & Marsh, 2011). Its vote-
share sank to some 17%. Its historically strong cross-class support base 
fragmented. Fianna Fáil was held responsible for causing the crisis, but it gained 
no credit for tackling the crisis consistently: this was one of the most dramatic 
experiences of the political toll taken by austerity on any European political 
party.   
But the political gains made by Fine Gael and Labour were not guaranteed to be 
durable. The government’s standing in the opinion polls fell sharply in the wake 
of the further tough measures they took in subsequent budgets. And 
notwithstanding some success in renegotiating some of the terms of the 
refinancing of Anglo Irish Bank, now a zombie bank with massive liabilities but 
no future as a functioning financial institution (Whelan, 2012), the government 
did not manage to gain any traction with the main issue on which it had 
campaigned originally, that is, retrospective European support for direct 
refinancing of the Irish banking sector.  
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Dynamics of party competition and the challenges of political legitimation 
In Spain and in Ireland, governments experienced less difficulty than in Greece in 
adopting and implementing tough budgets. But the Spanish and Irish terms of 
debate about what to do and when to do it proved to be very different from each 
other. This can best be understood by considering what the partisan profile of 
the party system looks like in each case, and how this translated into party 
competition in the context of crisis. 
The choice of economic strategy and the composition of budget adjustment was 
subject to regular and vigorous partisan debate in Spain, where strong left-right 
partisanship was well-established. Zapatero’s rhetoric was consistently 
Keynesian and Social Democratic. The shift in strategy in May 2010, he insisted, 
arose not from conviction but from necessity, under pressure from the 
international markets. And public opinion in Spain consistently showed much 
stronger support for tax increases over spending cuts. Ever since the 
stabilization of democracy had been assured through the belated expansion of 
the welfare state, a constituency of support had been built up that had a strong 
vested interest in welfare transfers and services (Molina & Rhodes, 2007).  
Partisan strategies of fiscal adjustment have been observed in Spain in the past 
(Mulas-Granados, 2006; von Hagen & Strauch, 2001). In the early 1990s, the 
PSOE undertook revenue-based adjustments that protected social policy, public 
wages and investment. Between 1996 and 2000, the conservative PP preferred 
expenditure-based strategies of adjustment that focused on spending cuts and 
structural reforms. Zapatero continually stressed the Social Democratic 
motivation of his initial strategy in 2008 and 2009. This is grounded in the 
broader Spanish Socialist conception of how structural adjustment may be 
undertaken without conceding the ground to conservative opinion, by enhancing 
competitiveness through building up the skill base, and improving productivity 
through public investment (Boix, 2003).  
In contrast, in Ireland, the political left was historically very weak, and most 
political contestation was tilted toward the centre-right, with little basis 
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therefore for clearly differentiated ideologically grounded debate over either 
policy objectives or the mix of policy methods. The ‘orthodox’ perspective that 
prioritized the need to restore fiscal business in order to boost business 
confidence was much more widely established than in Spain. Prevailing opinion 
among professional economists at the outset of the crisis was that the most 
appropriate course of action was ‘shock therapy’. Citing the experience of a ‘lost 
decade’ of delayed deficit reduction in the 1980s, they now recommended a 
quickly undertaken, massive fiscal consolidation, primarily based on spending 
cuts, and front-loading the pain (Kinsella & Leddin, 2010; McCarthy, 2010).  
Critical voices came from the trade union movement, which pointed to the 
changed circumstances of this crisis and the risks of choking off growth 
prospects (Begg, 2009; Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 2009a, 2009b). But this 
view gained little political traction. And public opinion in Ireland showed a 
consistent preference for spending cuts over tax increases, even after two 
decades of tax cuts had made Ireland one of the most lightly taxed of all the 
OECD countries (Regan, 2012). 
Both Ireland and Spain may be contrasted with Greece in the nature and scale of 
popular protest against the politics of austerity. Even in the face of very high 
unemployment, trade union leaders led largely peaceful short-term general 
strikes and occasional street protests without the violent confrontations that 
were a recurrent feature of Greek politics.  
Wage-setting institutions came under intolerable pressure in both countries as 
the crisis deepened. In Ireland, government chose not to follow the social 
partnership route of gradual efficiency-based cost recovery in December 2009, 
but imposed direct spending-based adjustment. In Spain, the government lost 
the support of the unions and left-wing political sectors after the May 2010 
emergency programme. Yet in both countries, some form of social dialogue was 
re-established. In Ireland, the public sector unions engaged in a new form of 
concession bargaining in June 2010, securing efficiency gains in exchange for a 
suspension of direct pay cuts. In Spain, a new social pact, deemed the most 
important since the celebrated Moncloa Pacts of 1978, was agreed in January 
 
24 
2011. This enabled the government to secure support for a critical pension 
reform (from 65 to 67; the Irish government had similarly changed public sector 
pension entitlements from 65 to 66 for new entrants as a matter of budget 
decision) (Rhodes, 2011). 
In the short term, the capacity to engage in even limited social dialogue and to 
negotiate social pacts is likely to result in a more coherent economic adjustment 
path, and by making it more legitimate, ensures its viability (Baccaro & Simoni, 
2008; Culpepper, 2008; Molina & Rhodes, 2007; Pérez, 2000; Pérez-Díaz, 1993; 
Roche, 2009). Social pacts were negotiated in both Spain and Ireland by 
governments of varying partisan composition. But social partnership may also 
have serious unintended consequences. For example, Spain, older ‘pactista’ 
traditions contributed to delaying reform of labour market rigidities that confer 
employment security to ‘insiders’ at the expense of other categories of workers 
(Cuñat, 2012). New forms of mass mobilization and street protests by labour 
market outsiders, especially young politically disaffected people, presented a 
new kind of challenge to the political insiders from both major parties during 
2011 and 2013.  
In Ireland, the insider power of the public sector and the low levels of 
unionization of the private sector, especially in the exporting sector, may have 
distorted wage structures (McGuinness, Kelly, & O'Connell, 2010). Public sector 
deals on pay cuts in 2010 and again in 2013 were undertaken under the clear 
threat of unilateral government action. But at the same time, the terms of the 
deals excluded those with the weakest power in the labour market in both public 
and private sectors, especially the growing numbers of temporary and part-time 
workers, the rising numbers of unemployed, and those who had voted with their 
feet in growing numbers and who had simply emigrated.   
And yet, in both Spain and Ireland, despite the extreme problems in securing 
market credibility and the profound challenges posed to the major political 
parties, in neither country has there been, to date, any fundamental challenge to 
the political system itself. Unlike in Greece, both countries managed to sustain 
some broad level of agreement across political parties about what the principal 
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objectives needed to be. Spanish parties were more adversary-inclined about 
policy objectives, at least until May 2010, and Irish parties more consensus-
inclined in their party positioning. Spanish political narratives also featured 
more adversarial narratives about the composition of policy adjustment. In 
neither country do we see the emergence of the strongly polarizing contestation 
that has characterized Greek politics, or the prevalence of street protests, nor has 
either country experienced the sustained rise of an anti-system protest party of 
the extreme right. Despite the stresses on social services, especially in Spain, 
neither country experienced the effective collapse of the social contract that, as 
Polanyi warned, could presage a fundamental threat to the sustainability of 
democracy itself.  
But neither should this be taken as grounds for complacency. Eurobarometer 
data on trust in national governments, shown in Figure 7, indicates a growing 
trend in popular dissatisfaction with their own national political systems among 
citizens in the Eurozone periphery countries. In mid-2012, no government had 
experienced net positive ratings since before the crisis. The average for the 17 
countries of the Eurozone as a whole was about -25%, and in Germany the figure 
was better again, at under -20%.  But dissatisfaction was most marked in Greece, 
where the difference between those who trust and those who do not trust their 
own government was recorded at a massive -80%. The other periphery 
countries were not far behind, with Spain, Portugal and Ireland recording rates 
of between -50% and -70%. Notwithstanding brief rallies with changes of 
government, the downward trend is very marked in all these countries; and it 
started as the first symptoms of impending crisis began to appear, with the 
stalling of the housing boom, the tightening of the availability of credit, and the 
worsening market performance of bank shares. It is far from clear what it would 
take for national governments to recover their political credibility and legitimacy 
in the eyes of their own citizens. 




In neither Spain nor in Ireland was there a fundamental problem of adopting and 
implementing harsh policies once they were deemed to be necessary. In both 
countries, external pressures coming from European policy-makers caused 
important policy shifts on the part of national governments. But there are 
marked differences in the way these decisions were arrived at, which can only be 
understood in the context of the partisan dynamics of party competition and the 
underlying political cleavages in the two societies. Partisan differentiation of 
policy preferences was more deeply rooted in Spain than in Ireland, which meant 
that the breach in the preferred government policy stance in May 2010 was 
particularly damaging for the incumbent PSOE. In Ireland, weak ideological 
differentiation and a more market-oriented political discourse made an orthodox 
policy response more acceptable to two successive governments. 
In both countries, though, we find that there are deeper consequences for the 
political legitimacy of the parties imposing austerity. The experience of duress, 
that is, the recognition that external pressures limited national options, 
generated additional citizen resentment in both Spain and Ireland. In Spain, the 
tipping point came in May 2010, when the PSOE was obliged to reverse its 
preferred policy response to crisis. In Ireland, the realization in September 2008 
that the banking system was out of control was the moment at which trust in 
government started to fall, but it was the terms of the loan programme in 
November 2010, which put the entire burden of the bank bail-out onto the Irish 
taxpayers, that was particularly resented. However, in both countries, voters 
found that they could change their government, but they could not change the 
policies. This resulted in growing dissatisfaction with and alienation from the 
political system. 
In both countries, the consequences of austerity include a worsening of social 
services and of the conditions underpinning social cohesion. In both countries, 
too, the crisis hit younger people harder than older people (in terms of job losses 
and exclusion from the labour market, household debt, and the burden of 
negative equity). In Spain, the distributive impact of adjustment measures tilted 
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over time, and since 2011, they have been broadly regressive in their effects. In 
Ireland, although the most salient forms of new tax – the Universal Social Charge, 
a tax on residential property, and moves to introduce water charges – were those 
that had a regressive impact, it has been estimated that the cumulative impact of 
all the tax and spending measures has been broadly progressive (Callan, Keane, 
Savage, & Walsh, 2012). But the reduction in access to public services, and 
especially the worsening of deep-seated inequalities in access to health services, 








Figure 1. The scale of fiscal effort, 2009-2012 
 
 
 Source: General government underlying primary balances. OECD Economic 
Outlook, Vol. 2012, Issue 2, 17 December 2012. Accessed 16 January 2013.  
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Table 1. Expected and actual deficit out-turns in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal 
 
 
EU projections 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
SPAIN       
Spring 2010 9.8 7.5 5.3 3.0   
Spring 2011 9.2 6.0 4.4 3.0 2.1  
Spring 2012 9.2 8.5 5.3 3.0 2.2 1.1 
Spring 2013   10.6 6.3 5.5 4.1 
       
IRELAND       
Winter 2009 11.6 10 7.2 4.9   
Spring 2011 32.4 10.0 8.6 7.2 4.7 2.8 
Spring 2012 31.3 9.9 8.6 7.6 4.8 3.0 
Spring 2013   7.6 7.4 4.3 2.2 
       
GREECE       
Autumn 2010 9.4 7.4 6.5 4.8 2.6  
Spring 2011 10.5 7.6 6.5 4.8 2.6  
Autumn 2011 10.6 8.7 7.0 5.3 2.9  
Spring 2012 10.6 9.3 7.3 4.6 2.1  
Summer 2013  9.4 6.3 4.1 3.3 2.1 
       
PORTUGAL       
Spring 2010  8.3 6.6 4.6 2.8   
Spring 2011 9.1 5.9 4.5 3.0 2.3 1.9 
Spring 2012 9.8 4.2 4.5 3.0 2.3 1.9 
Spring 2013  4.4 6.4 5.5 4.0 2.5 
Autumn 2013   6.4 5.9 4.0 2.5 








Figure 2. Ten-year interest rates on government bonds 
 
 
Source: ECB Harmonised long-term interest rates for convergence assessment 






























Source: Metroscopia opinion polls,  
http://www.metroscopia.org/seriestemporales/item/estimacion-resultado-




Figure 5. Ratings agencies’ ratings for Ireland 
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Figure 6. Opinion poll ratings of political parties in Ireland 
 
 
Source: RedC poll data, from http://electionsireland.org/polls.cfm, accessed 15 
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